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Airports are typically monopolistic providers of aeronautical services. Hence, the widespread
privatization of airports within the last 20 years has in general been accompanied by some
form of price regulation of aeronautical services. A great deal of attention has been given to
the issue of whether the aeronautical price cap should be based upon revenues from both
aeronautical and commercial services (the “single-till” approach) or revenues from
aeronautical services only (the “dual-till” approach). However, each of these regulatory
schemes will in general lead to regulated prices that are Pareto inefficient. This paper
presents a price capping scheme that systematically exploits the potential Pareto
improvements available under either the single-till or dual-till regimes.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Airports are typically monopolistic providers of aeronautical services.  Hence, the widespread 
privatization of airports within the last 20 years has in general been accompanied by some form 
of price regulation of aeronautical services.  Generally speaking, all airport charges may be 
classified as either aeronautical or commercial charges.  Aeronautical charges include aircraft 
landing, parking, take-off, and maintenance fees as well as air traffic control fees (“landing 
charges”).  Aeronautical charges also include fees for originating, departing, transfer, and transit 
passengers (“passenger charges”).  Commercial charges include charges for leasing of terminal 
retail shopping concessions, banking, car parking and rental, etc. 
 
  One issue that has received a great deal of attention is that of whether it is preferable to adopt 
a “single-till” or “dual-till” approach to airport regulation.  Under a single-till price cap regime, 
regulated aeronautical charges are determined using both aeronautical and commercial revenues 
and costs.  In this case, revenues from commercial activities cover deficits incurred in the 
provision of aeronautical services.  Under a dual-till price cap regime, the aeronautical and 
commercial components of the airport’s operations are separated and regulated aeronautical 
charges are set such that costs incurred in the provision of aeronautical services are completely 
covered by aeronautical revenues.  Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (2004) find empirical evidence of 
increased input efficiency under a dual-till regime.  Applying a Hotelling-type location model, 
Czerny (2006) demonstrates that for a noncongested airport, the single-till price cap regime is 
welfare superior to the dual-till regime.  Similarly, Lu and Pagliari (2004) perform a 
comprehensive welfare-based investigation of the issue.  They conclude that the single-till 
approach yields higher social welfare for a noncongested airport, whereas the dual-till approach 
is welfare superior for a congested airport. 
 
  Both regulatory schemes, however, lead to regulated pricing policies that are Pareto 
inefficient.  Indeed, it is straightforward to show that under both the single-till and the dual-till 
regimes, it is possible to increase consumer welfare, given the profit level earned by the airport.  
We are thus led to consider the design of alternative price cap schemes that permit the 
exploitation of the mutual gains available under the single-till and dual-till regimes. 
 
  In this paper, we first discuss the unique complementary nature of the demands for 
aeronautical and commercial services.  We then present a price capping scheme that will 
simultaneously yield gains to both consumers and the regulated airport, thus exploiting potential 
Pareto improvements available at the status quo.  Hence, regardless of whether the regulatory 
authority is currently employing a single-till or a dual-till regulatory scheme, (repeated) 
application of our proposed price capping scheme will result in a monotonically increasing 
sequence of consumer welfare levels and airport profits. 
 
 
2.  The model 
 
As discussed previously, all airport charges may be classified as either aeronautical or 
commercial charges.  Let x1 and x2 denote the quantities of aeronautical and commercial services 
consumed (per time period), respectively.  We let p1 denote the price of aeronautical services 2 
(i.e., the “price of a flight”) and p2 denote the price of commercial services.  We shall assume 
that airlines and commercial service providers operate under conditions of perfect competition 
with constant marginal costs.  Thus the prices charged by the airport to airlines and commercial 
service operators are identical to the prices paid by consumers for these services.  Demands for 
aeronautical and commercial services are  ) , ( and ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 p p x p x .  Only passengers can purchase 
commercial services, in which case the demand for commercial services depends on the price of 
a flight but not the converse.  Consumer surplus from flights is  ) ( 1 1 p V , which is assumed convex 
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dx f  for all p1, p2.  This 







x d  for all p1.  It is therefore assumed that the demand for 
aeronautical services is convex.  It should be noted that this includes both the linear and constant 



















  Observe that in this formulation, the demand for flights and the demand for commercial 
services per flight are independent.  Passengers are therefore assumed to make two separate 
decisions in travel.  First, airline tickets are purchased based on the price of a flight.  Then, after 
arrival at the airport, passengers make purchasing decisions for commercial services based on the 
prices of these services.  This two-part decision making may be justified by the fact that for the 
typical passenger, a substantial amount of time will typically elapse between the date of the 
ticket purchase and the date of the purchase of the commercial services  (the date of travel) 
(Zhang and Zhang 1997).   
 
 
3.  An alternative price cap scheme 
 
Under both the single-till and dual-till schemes, only the price of aeronautical services is capped.  
The airport thus selects prices to maximize  ) , ( 2 1 p p π  subject to p1 ≤ k where π denotes the 
airport’s profit function (given the total existing capacity of aeronautical services), and k denotes 
the level of the price cap.  Under single-till regulation, the level of k is selected so that overall 
airport profit is zero.  Under the dual-till scheme, k is selected so that profits from aeronautical 
services are zero.  Under a binding price cap constraint, profit maximization requires  μ = π
1 p  and 
0
2 = π p , μ > 0 where the subscripts denote the partial derivatives of π.  However, a Pareto 
efficient price vector requires  0 ), , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 < λ π ∇ λ = ∇ p p p p V where  V ∇ and  π ∇  denote the 
gradients (vectors of partial derivatives) of V and π, respectively.  Simultaneous satisfaction of 
these conditions, however, requires that  0 ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 2 = − = p x p x V
f
p , a contradiction.  Hence, the 
single-till and dual-till price cap schemes can never result in efficient pricing. 
 
  To consider the possibility of improving upon such outcomes, suppose that the current (time 
period t) price vector is ( )
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Then (1) may be expressed as 
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Furthermore, suppose that c1 and c2 denote the cost of providing each unit of aeronautical and 
commercial services during any time period under current aeronautical capacity.  Since  1 1 c p
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demand for aeronautical services is convex and consumer surplus is monotonically decreasing in 
prices.  Now let s = s1s2 and note that if 
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+ + . Therefore, application of (3) generates a Pareto improvement relative 
to the status quo.  The price cap is illustrated in Figure 2.  Constraint (3a) is satisfied in the 
diagonally shaded region.  Constraint (3b) is satisfied in the horizontally shaded region.  The 
entire shaded area lies below the iso-surplus curve passing through ( )
t t p p 2 1,  , ensuring that 





























4.  Discussion 
 
The price cap scheme described by (3) generates Pareto improvements relative to the status quo 
by bringing the price of commercial services into the sphere of regulatory control.  A 
conventional Laspeyres-based price cap cannot, however, be applied to airport regulation 
because of the asymmetric nature of the demands for aeronautical and commercial services, i.e., 
the demand for commercial services depends on the price of a flight but not vice versa.  Our 
process works by exploiting bounds on the value of the derivative of the demand for aeronautical 
services and the value of consumer surplus for commercial services.  Specifically, 
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aeronautical services and an upper bound on the level of consumer surplus for commercial 
services.  Bounds can be determined by estimating (i) the price elasticity of demand for 
aeronautical services and (ii) consumer surplus for commercial services when both aeronautical 
and commercial services are priced as marginal cost.  While the process will in general result in 
simultaneous increases in consumer welfare and profit, a limit point of the procedure need not be 
a Pareto efficient price vector as is the case with conventional Laspeyres-based price cap 
regulation (e.g., Vogelsang and Finsinger 1979; Brennan 1989).  This follows from the fact that 
the two-part price cap constraint in (3) is not differentiable.  Thus, the process could terminate at 
a point for which additional Pareto improvements are possible.  Of course, if the regulator has 
sufficient information to apply (2) directly in each time period, any limit point of the process will 
be Pareto efficient.  In any case, as our results indicate that bringing the price of commercial 
services into the sphere of regulatory control in the manner described may generate substantial 
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